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AThe Very Possibility of a Science
of Religion: Ernst Troeltsch
and Neo-Kantianism
Peter Woodford / University of CambridgeErnst Troeltsch appended an intriguing and cryptic footnote in 1912 to an
early essay from 1893/94 that was to be republished in a new volume of his
collected works, The Christian Worldview and Its Counter-Currents (Die Christ-
liche Weltanschauung und Ihre Gegenströmungen), in which he declared
that the intervening years had resulted in “a shift of philosophical stand-
point from Lotze and Dilthey to Windelband and Rickert.”1 Troeltsch re-
peated this claim in his late autobiographical essay from 1922, “My Books”
(Meine Bücher), which went on to elaborate in greater detail what this shift
consisted of. The question of what precisely changed in Troeltsch’s outlook
has been the topic of much debate, fueled in part by that fact that in both
instances Troeltsch immediately qualified his professed “shift” in a manner
that left it unclear to what extent, if any, his views were actually aligned with
the Baden neo-Kantian school that culminated in Rickert, and that he clearly
admired. On the one hand, this question might be considered merely bio-
graphical minutia of early twentieth-century German thought. On the other,
it concerns a key and foundational problem that continues to arise for schol-
ars of religion as they address the place of philosophy in the field, next to
historical, anthropological, and social scientific approaches.2 Troeltsch’s move
from Lotze and Dilthey to Windelband and Rickert signified a new way of
understanding the role of normative inquiry and values in scholarship and
scientific research. For Troeltsch, and for the Baden school, the problem of
normativity more than any other became a point of contact that exposed the
fault lines between the sciences, philosophy, and religious thought itself. The© 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0022-4189/2017/9701-0003$10.00
1 Ernst Troeltsch, “Die Christliche Weltanschauung und Ihre Gegenströmungen,” in Gesam-
melte Schriften, vol. 2, ed. Hans Baron (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1913), 227.
2 There have been a number of treatments of this topic, including Robert Pippin, “The
Natural and the Normative,” Daedalus 138, no. 3 (2009): 35–43; Kevin Schilbrack, Philosophy
and the Study of Religions: A Manifesto (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014); Thomas Lewis, Why Phi-
losophy Matters for the Study of Religion & Vice Versa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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A Science of Religionprimary goal of this essay is to use the question of the extent to which Troeltsch
actually adopted Rickert’s theory of normativity to uncover an illuminating
episode at the origins of a persisting issue in the field. This episode is espe-
cially relevant precisely because it took place during the early period in which
a so-called properly scientific study of religion (Religionswissenschaft) was being
conceived and established within the academy.
Of course, investigating to what extent Troeltsch turned to Rickert’s neo-
Kantianism requires an analysis of what the core views and concerns of Ba-
den neo-Kantianism were. Windelband and Rickert have been labeled by
subsequent historians of philosophy as Wertphilosophen (philosophers of value)
and normativity theorists, whose central problem was how to make sense
of the undeniably normative character of epistemic claims to knowledge and
truth within the professed value-neutral, descriptive, and explanatory stance
of the natural and historical sciences.3 The philosophical debates over norms
and values that Windelband and Rickert were immersed in erupted into a
controversy over psychologism that came to define a philosophical genera-
tion. The psychologism debates involved a wide spectrum of philosophers
and seminal figures in the establishment of scientific fields in the German
academy—the Marburg neo-Kantians Paul Natorp and Hermann Cohen, Wil-
helm Dilthey, founder of empirical psychology Wilhelm Wundt, sociolo-
gists Georg Simmel and Max Weber, Franz Brentano, and even the seminal
thinker in the formation of analytic philosophy Gottlob Frege, among many
others. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, which later inspired a former
doctoral student of Rickert’s, Martin Heidegger, also aimed to develop an al-
ternative to psychologistic theories of intentionality and mental represen-
tation.4 Indeed, it was through the issue of psychologism that these thinkers
debated how to make sense of the place of normative inquiry in the emerg-
ing effort to generate a scientific study of religion. Troeltsch’s footnote on
Rickert and the essays he wrote on this newly emerging science of religion
positioned him within this wider constellation of thinkers and the epochal
problem of psychologism that defined turn-of-the-century academic philoso-
phy in Germany.
These debates over psychologism turned out to be enormously complex
and multifaceted, and defining psychologism is a challenge because it was
used differently and often polemically by many of its critics. The crucial as-
pect of the problem that concerns us here began as a question of whether
logical rules of inference and reasoning—and even concepts themselves with
their attendant necessary and sufficient conditions of application—could be
understood as psychological facts about how the human mind functions (is’s)3 See Frederick Beiser, “Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall,” International Jour-
nal of Philosophical Studies 17, no. 1 (2009): 9–27.
4 R. Lanier Anderson, “Neo-Kantianism and the Roots of Anti-psychologism,” British Journal
of the History of Philosophy 13, no. 2 (2005): 287–323. Husserl took over Rickert’s chair in Frei-
burg in 1915 after Rickert moved to a position in Heidelberg.
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Aor if, instead, they contained irreducibly normative, prescriptive content that
set criteria for what counts as valid thinking (oughts). While this psychologism
problem began by focusing on problems in logic, scientific method, and epis-
temology, it soon spread to all arenas of human agency and inquiry in which
ideal values (Werte) were posited and sought after, including ethics, politics,
law, religion, and even aesthetics. If thought and action were regulated by
normative prescriptions, the question turned to the problem of what features
of the world, if any, could justify their claim to being valid: Where did such
principles come from? How could we know them? How could they be jus-
tified? Psychologism was the view that the normative authority of prescrip-
tive claims in all areas had to be justified on the basis of facts about subjec-
tive psychological processes or even biological drives that they regulated and
that were thought to give rise to them in the first place. Critics of psycholo-
gism, like Rickert, generally maintained that if norms and values were to be
considered to be truly valid, this validity could not depend on whether or not
any minds recognized them at all. Valid values, like the external world that
our minds aim to represent, must be thought of as genuinely independent
of subjective acts of valuing such that we might be wrong about what aims
are genuinely worthy to pursue, or what concepts actually capture the phe-
nomena they represent. If this was to be the case, genuinely valid values and
norms could not be explained or reduced to facts about natural processes
taking place in anyone’s psyche or to subjective attitudes shaped by large-scale
social and historical processes.
Troeltsch and Rickert both shared the sense that the insights of classical
German Idealism, especially Kant and Fichte, finally supplied the intellec-
tual resources for rejecting all of the philosophical schools that they saw
to be based on a psychologistic reduction of valid norms and values to nat-
ural or historical facts: naturalism, historicism, and materialism.5 However,
against an astonishingly similar set of background assumptions, both think-
ers went in very different directions, and these different directions are es-
pecially salient, as I attempt to show here, when one examines how each ap-
proached the philosophy of religion. Rickert began as a philosopher of
science and methodology and only later applied his conclusions about the
place of normativity insciencetoallareasof “rationally infused”(geistig)activ-
ity, in which he included religion. Troeltsch straight away attempted to apply
the core insights of Baden neo-Kantianism to challenge underlying
philosophicalpremisesof the newly emerging project of a science of religion.
Rickert and Troeltsch ended up at positions that were remarkably close, but
the points of their divergence are enough to question Troeltsch’s genuine5 Indeed, much of the recovery of Kant and especially Hegel in contemporary philosophy
comes from similar concerns over how to understand the relationship between causes and
reasons, facts and values, natural events and normative principles, and the metaethical impli-
cations of this relationship. See, e.g., the recent collection of essays Naturalism and Normativity,
ed. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
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A Science of Religionturn to Rickert’s philosophy. The following article explores the nature of
Troeltsch’s reluctance toward Rickert in order to expose a key problem of
continuing theoretical concern, namely, the problem of the legitimacy and
character of metaphysics within the scientific enterprise.
The first section of this article presents the main tenets of Rickert’s philos-
ophy as characteristic of the Baden school’s position on the role of nor-
mativity in the sciences. Next, I compare these views to the positions that
Troeltsch defended in essays from the first decade of the twentieth century,
the period during which he claimed that his shift had taken place. The con-
clusion that I come to is that despite Troeltsch’s profession of a turn to Win-
delband and Rickert, his continued commitment to the possibility of a meta-
physical worldview that was both consistent with and implied by scientific
knowledge violated a core premise of the Baden neo-Kantian theory of nor-
mativity. Troeltsch’s criticisms of Rickert and his own approach to under-
standing the relationship between is and ought challenged some of Rickert’s
most basic philosophical commitments. The confrontation between these
views serves to remind us that the foundational problem of the ground of
normativity—a problem in the study of religion that also emerges in theo-
retical debates about the epistemological foundations of the social and nat-
ural sciences—was crucial to theoretical debates that shaped the emerging
discipline.I . R ICKERT ’S NEO-KANTIAN THEORY OF VALUE
Heinrich Rickert and his mentor Wilhelm Windelband often find a place in
the history of philosophy as contributors to the great Methodenstreit between
the Natur- andGeisteswissenschaften in Germany during the late 1880s and 90s.
In contrast to other thinkers who faced the question of the line of demarca-
tion between the natural sciences and the human sciences, Windelband and
Rickert distinguished themselves by drawing this line in purely methodolog-
ical terms. The natural sciences and the human sciences do not study differ-
ent kinds of stuff or different domains of reality, let us say mental and phys-
ical or action and event, but rather set out with different explanatory aims
and different means appropriate to these aims. The “idiographic” human
sciences, in particular history, aim to describe and explain individual, non-
repeating events, individuals, movements, and cultural formations, while the
“nomothetic” natural sciences aim to discover in particular instances the op-
eration of laws that apply generally and, ultimately, at all places and times.
What is often missing from such surveys is the fact that this position on sci-
entific methodology was offered against the background of a confrontation
with the fundamental problems of knowledge, mind, truth, and value that
have shaped Western philosophy. In contemporary philosophical parlance,
we can say that the main concern of this southwest, “Baden” neo-Kantian
school lay in metaethics, or metalogic, and centered around the nature of59
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Anormativity; in the philosophical terminology of turn-of-the-century German
thought, it was the problem of understanding the proper relation between
das Sein (the is) and das Sollen (the ought ).
Rickert’s position on this problem took over Kant’s pivotal distinction be-
tween a quaestio facti and a quaestio juris from the famous “Transcendental De-
duction of the Categories” section of the first Critique. For Windelband and
Rickert, this distinction was a discovery of the fundamental difference be-
tween questions of normative justification and questions of fact, between the
irreducibly normative space of reasons governing human thought and agency
and the space of causes that govern natural events, which the sciences aim
to explain. In this hugely consequential section for both contemporary and
nineteenth-century interpreters of Kant, Kant argues that there is a funda-
mental logical difference between acknowledging the fact that we use certain
basic categories—such as substance and accident, cause and effect, necessity
and contingency—to render the world intelligible (quaestio facti), and asking
what right we have tomake normative validity claims, claims to knowledge and
truth, using these categories (quaestio juris).6 The former is a psychological
question that requires, in Kant’s terminology, a “physiological” derivation,
while the latter is an epistemological question that requires a “transcenden-
tal” deduction.7
Rickert’s basic philosophical move was to insist on the priority of the
quaestio juris (the ought) to the quaestio facti (the is) of epistemology to psy-
chology. Not only were matters of fact and matters of normative justification
answering different questions, to establish what is the case—even in the realm
of the mental—always involves positing a normative value (Wert) or criterion
that is presupposed as a value one ought to aim at and that inquiry is directed
toward realizing. To see how this claim could be made plausible, it is im-
portant to describe the picture of rational agency that Rickert’s analysis of
scientific methodology rested on. As Rickert claimed in his late program-
matic workThe System of Philosophy from 1921, “The idea of a science is always
the concept of a task to be carried out.”8 Rickert’s subordination of Sein to
Sollen was a consequence of his conception of science as an activity carried
out by a thinking agent. Like any other act or task, science too presupposed
an objective or aim, and this objective was to be found in the value that
it sought to realize and the normative criterion it instituted to measure its
success or failure. Facts and values could not be separated neatly for Rickert,
but this was not because there is no so-called naturalistic fallacy that is com-
mitted in logically deriving norms from statements of fact (Rickert believed
such purported derivations were not logically valid). Rather, even the most6 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 220 [A84/B116–17].
7 Ibid., 220–21 [A85-86/B117–19].
8 Heinrich Rickert, System der Philosophie: Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie (Tübingen:
Mohr-Siebeck, 1921), 153.
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A Science of Religionbasic empirical judgment invokes a normative criterion and involves a com-
mitment to a value that is taken to be normative.9 The ought (Sollen) was prior
to the is (Sein) because investigating and representing the world is a norm-
governed activity guided by a commitment to the value that it seeks to realize.
Rickert articulated these views in his first published work from 1892, Der
Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (The object of knowledge). This work was to be a
sort of introduction to the basic viewpoint of transcendental philosophy and
a demonstration of the normative and value-laden character of knowledge
claims in the sciences. Rickert understood his conception of science too as
carrying through early insights of Kant, in this case Kant’s claim that nat-
ural science is oriented by regulative ideals of reason that guide it toward the
completion of its investigation of nature.10 Rickert envisioned the project of
theoretical knowledge, whose tools were the natural and historical sciences,
to be guided by the value of truth for its own sake and not as a means to some
other end or for the sake of any extrascientific value, whether moral, aes-
thetic, or religious. The problem with psychologistic theories that considered
values to be the product of subjective, psychological events was that such an
intrinsic value could not be coherently conceived, so, could not be ratio-
nally vindicated either. It could only appear as some kind of subjective pro-
jection or illusion over against a valueless physical world, and so the validity
of scientific knowledge too crumbled in the face of the materialist picture
that threatened values in all other cultural spheres as well.
Rickert’s main concern in his writings on epistemology and methodology
was to show that understanding our epistemic situation in this way had to be
confused. How could knowledge be undermined by a picture of nature that
also undermines the very criteria by which this picture has been generated
and justified? Rickert’s argument against psychologistic and subjectivist the-
ories of value harkens back to ancient attempts to refute skepticism, as he
writes that “[a] transcendental ought as the object of knowledge is, regard-
less of what epistemological standpoint one assumes, indubitable, because it
is the presupposition of every true judgment, indeed even every theoretical
doubt and thereby the presupposition of every standpoint, with the inclu-
sion of skepticism.”11 In other words, there is a contradiction involved in de-
nying the value of truth for its own sake, since this denial presupposes the
aim of determining facts about the epistemic situation and the distinction9 Rickert’s opposition to the attempt to derive norms from natural events, or anything out-
side of reason, is evidenced by his criticisms of the movement of Lebensphilosophie. See
Heinrich Rickert, Die Philosophie des Lebens: Darstellung und Kritik der Modeströmungen unserer Zeit
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1920). I analyze Rickert’s criticisms of Lebensphilosophie and the im-
plication that debates over biological sources of normativity had for the philosophy of religion in
my dissertation, “Religion, Science, and Value in Nietzschean Life-Philosophy” (PhD diss., Stan-
ford University, 2013).
10 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 551 [A565/B613].
11 Heinrich Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis: Einführung in die Tranzendental Philosophie,
5th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1921).
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Abetween getting the world right and getting it wrong. It thereby presup-
poses recognition of the normative validity of the truth it appears to deny.
Of course, by showing that the scientific search for knowledge presupposed
a normative value that was not itself a direct object of empirical investigation
within the bounds of experience, Rickert also secured a necessary place for
philosophy as Erkenntnistheorie within the broader scientific enterprise. Phi-
losophy was charged with clarifying and making explicit the nonempirical,
even nonreal (irreal), normative oughts that were presupposed background
assumptions of all areas of human activity. The role of philosophy next to the
special sciences thus rested on the case against subjectivist and psycholo-
gistic theories of value and on the priority of commitment to norms to ques-
tions of genesis, origin, history, and cause.
Rickert’s legacy in the epochal debates over psychologism was his insis-
tence that the recognition of the objectivity of valid values is a necessary pre-
supposition of thought and agency. As all action involved aiming at the re-
alization of a value, so too did scientific inquiry. Indeed, all of culture was to
be understood as the striving toward the realization of values, and the aim of
philosophy was to investigate to what extent this striving could be justified.
Rickert’s view of science as an activity guided by norms gave him a unique
angle for investigating the relationship between science and other forms
of human activity. He turned to the relationship between science and other
spheres of culture, in which he included religion, later in his career as he
turned from questions of epistemology and science to the project of a com-
prehensive system of all cultural values that he explicitly tied to the legacy of
Kant.12
The core of Rickert’s philosophy of religion lay in two sets of distinctions
that were fundamental to his philosophical outlook. The first was the dis-
tinction between the theoretical value of knowledge enshrined in the sci-
ences and atheoretical values, such as beauty, justice, goodness, and tran-
scendence, that were pursued in nonintellectualist spheres of culture. As we
have seen, Rickert offered a transcendental argument to show that the ob-
jective value of truth is a logical presupposition of reason. As he turned his
attention away from science to other spheres of culture, he argued that one
could not provide any such argument for nonintellectualist values. Instead,
the element of rational necessity possessed by atheoretical cultural values
needed to be understood by linking them to universal structures of prac-
tical life.13 The epistemological approach to cultural values differed from
the naturalist and the genealogical, or historicist, because it viewed the ma-
terial of cultural history through the idea of some underlying rational struc-
ture. Unlike naturalistic Lebensphilosophie, the ideals contained in cultural value12 Heinrich Rickert, Kant als Philosoph der Modernen Kultur [Kant as philosopher of modern
culture] (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1924).
13 Rickert, System der Philosophie, 356.
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A Science of Religionspheres were not products of biological necessity, vital drive, or function, but
rather were products of a necessity that stemmed from the self-legislating ca-
pacity of reason.14 This is where Rickert’s neo-Kantian theory of culture began,
especially, to extend Kant’s conception of ideals of reason that guide the
intellect toward the completion of its search for knowledge to other domains
of human activity.
There is not enough space to go into the details of the procedure of
Rickert’s formal derivation of the nonreal values that constituted ethical, aes-
thetic, religious, and political life. However, it is necessary to state the overall
aim of Rickert’s system of values. For Rickert, values could only be considered
universally valid if they could be shown to be necessary presuppositions of
thought and action. Just as the value of truth could be derived by reflecting
on the presupposition of the capacity of representation, he argued that fur-
ther values could be derived by asking what it would take to fully realize and
complete other basic human capacities. As Kant found that reason necessar-
ily sought the unconditioned for every series of conditions in the sphere of
knowledge and intellect, so Rickert found that reason sought a full comple-
tion of other aspects of human life. For instance, the temporal conditions
of action in past, present, and future; the arenas of individual (personal)
and social life; and, finally, intellectual and nonintellectual capacities all spec-
ified universal parameters of human action and thought to which values
must be attached. Redeeming the validity of cultural values required showing
how different concrete aims embedded in culture offered the actualization
and completion of projects tied to these basic features. For example, Rickert
envisioned ethical life as the search for individual self-cultivation and comple-
tion; politics sought the social good of a just communal order in which soci-
ety would achieve its completion; art sought the experience of beauty through
intuition; and religion pursued the value of the full completion of all striv-
ing in a supra-mundane order. Each of these ideals could be further speci-
fied according to the temporal condition in which such realization was sought,
namely, in the present, in the indeterminate future, or even in an otherworldly
sphere.15
The second distinction that Rickert made was between science (Wissen-
schaft) and worldview (Weltanschauung). The sciences could investigate the
sphere of what is (being), but they could not through their own resources
make a transition from description and explanation into the normative sphere
of the ought. Philosophy can clarify, justify, and derive normative oughts that
are presupposed in theoretical science and everyday life more generally, but
it too was limited in that Rickert relegated claims about the unity of being
and value and about how and whether ideal values can be realized in the exist-
ing world to the sphere of faith. For Rickert, this question exceeded the bound-14 Rickert, Die Philosophie des Lebens, n. 8.
15 Rickert, System der Philosophie, 379–80.
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Aaries of the critical reflection on experience and the presuppositions of rea-
son that form the limits of any rational inquiry. Philosophy as an attendant
to empirical science was thus left with a dualism that it could not overcome,
and although Rickert entertained the idea of a primordial unity of being and
value in a proto-physical realm (prophysik) later in his career, he remained
staunchly critical of any attempt to resolve this division through reason alone.
Religion always played a dual role in Rickert’s thought. On the one hand,
it was an atheoretical cultural value-sphere that pursued its own unique value
of a final realization and full completion of practical striving. This value, like
the values of ethical goodness, aesthetic beauty, and theoretical truth, could
be derived in an a priori fashion because, Rickert claimed, it presented a fi-
nal or ultimate value whose formal content was simply the final completion
of the aims of all thought and action, whatever these aims were. On the other
hand, religion was a theoretical arena in which a conception of a transcen-
dent, metaphysical unity of being and value, the is and the ought, was pro-
posed. Yet in both theoretical and practical spheres, religion played the role
of the cultural arena in which a final realization of the aims of both thought
and action, the activities of nonintellectual life and of intellectual understand-
ing, was posited and sought after. Both theoretical and atheoretical spheres
pointed toward a final completion of each of their more immediate aims, seek-
ing an unconditioned aim that would encompass and surpass all others.I I . TROELTSCH AND BADEN NEO-KANTIANISM
Troeltsch was bitten by the Kantian bug very early in his intellectual devel-
opment. In his 1922 autobiographical essay “My Books,” Troeltsch empha-
sizes the importance of reading Kant and post-Kantian German Idealist think-
ers during his years as a student of theology in Erlangen.16 It was not simply
admiration of his teachers or nationalist sentiment that pushed him toward
the study of the great figures of classical German Idealism—Kant, Fichte, and
Schleiermacher—but rather, as he puts it, “the ‘vital question’ [Lebensfrage] of
the right to religious orientation in the face of an all-devouring modern nat-
uralism” that was sweeping the German academy and culture as a whole.17
In response to this distinctly “vital” concern brought on by the threat of sci-
entific materialism, Troeltsch’s teacher Gustav Class pointed him to the work
of the forefather of Baden neo-Kantianism, Hermann Lotze.
The fact that Troeltsch early on turned to Lotze to address his concerns
with the mechanistic and materialist picture of nature emerging from the
sciences is a telling indication of the steps that led him to Rickert’s work, which
Troeltsch helpfully narrated in this autobiographical essay. Lotze taught Rickert’s16 Ernst Troeltsch, “Meine Bücher,” inGesammelte Schriften, vol. 4, ed. Hans Baron (Tübingen:
J. C. B. Mohr, 1925), 5.
17 Ibid.
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was to challenge the assumptions behind a commonly held notion that nat-
ural science showed normatively valid values and meanings (Sinn) to be an
illusionwithin the blind,mechanistic causal order of thematerial world. Lotze’s
strategy to redeem the validity of meaning and value was to challenge the ex-
clusive hegemony of a mechanistic view of nature and to set alongside blind
mechanical laws a teleological sphere rooted in goal-directed agency, in which
natural ends and purposes could be seen to emerge.18 By distinguishing ame-
chanical sphere of existence or actuality from a teleological sphere oriented
by value and validity most pronounced in the living world yet extending to
the whole of nature, themechanistically driven natural sciences and the sphere
of the ideal could formmutually exclusive, equally legitimate, “non-overlapping
magisteria.”19 Lotze’s strategy thus opposed so-called reductive forms of nat-
uralism by developing a Naturphilosophie in which a sphere of freedom and
directed agency coexisted alongside the blind mechanisms that were con-
tinually sought by the natural sciences.20
As Troeltsch looked back on his life’s work in his autobiographical essay,
he remarked that both Lotze and philosopher of the human sciences Wil-
helm Dilthey at first helped him gain a handle on the limitations of natu-
ralism for studying the ideal contents of human culture that oriented and
gave direction to human thinking and acting (Geist). They helped Troeltsch
develop a critical foothold against the view of nature that underpinned the
Darwinian evolutionists of his day, and Troeltsch traced Lotze’s teleological
interpretation of the physical world back to Leibniz’s “organicist” metaphys-
ics and monadology.21 However, in this late essay, Troeltsch stressed again
the claim of his 1912 footnote that Lotze and Dilthey would prove insuffi-
cient precisely on the point of “the transition from psychological description
and analysis to the critical investigation of value [Wert] and truth-content, in-
deed to the problem of the relationship between psychological analysis and
norm-theoretical [gultigkeitstheoretischer] recognition.”22 Here we can see that18 For a helpful overview of Lotze’s life and writings, see Frederick Beiser’s recent study Late
German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
19 This phrase refers to an article by the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould, who fa-
mously defended the claim that religion and science form “non-overlapping magisteria” that
do not come into conflict. See Stephen Jay Gould, “Nonoverlapping Magisteria,” Natural His-
tory 106 (1997): 16–22. Troeltsch and Rickert can be seen as critics of this view, as they both
thought that science could undermine the validity of religious claims and, alternatively, that
philosophy and philosophical theology could compete with overly reductive pictures from the
sciences. Both Troeltsch and Rickert found that the sciences inevitably raised metaphysical and
metaethical problems that overlapped with questions central to both philosophy and religious
thought.
20 The importance of Kant’s philosophy of biology in his third critique, Critique of the Power
of Judgment, which often goes unmentioned in studies of neo-Kantianism, is clearly evident in
Lotze’s defense of teleology and critique of the mechanistic natural sciences.
21 Troeltsch, “Meine Bücher,” 6.
22 Ibid., 9.
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ATroeltsch’s dissatisfaction with psychologism in the theory of value and in epis-
temology led him to once again affirm his shift toward Rickert’s antipsycho-
logistic, transcendental theory of validity. Following this claim, Troeltsch went
on to write that his shift was most thoroughly worked out in a variety of essays
from the first decade of the twentieth century that dealt with the science
and philosophy of religion. These were a lecture held in St. Louis in 1904
on “Psychology and Epistemology in the Science of Religion” (Psychologie
und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft), a short book from
1904on The Historical in Kant’s Philosophy of Religion (Das Historische in Kants
Philosophie der Religion), and finally an essay on “Philosophy of Religion”
(Religionsphilosophie) published in a Festschrift dedicated to the neo-Kantian
Kuno Fischer in 1905, which also contained a piece by Rickert on the philos-
ophy of history. The goal of the rest of this section is to analyze these publi-
cations and early essays leading up to them to come to some conclusions about
Troeltsch’s alignment withWindelband and Rickert.
Between 1895 and 1896, directly following his essay on “Die Christliche
Weltanschauung und ihre Gegenströmungen,” Troeltsch penned a long es-
say entitled “The Autonomy [Selbstständigkeit] of Religion” that appeared in
three separately published pieces in the Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.23
This essay opens with the aim of defending what Troeltsch identifies as an
idealist perspective on the problem of the relationship betweenGeist and
Natur, a problem that we might recognize today as a more general formula-
tion of the mind/body problem in the philosophy of mind.24 This essay de-
fends what Troeltsch calls an “idealist” thesis that religion is “an autonomous
arena of life [Lebensgebiet] that develops and shapes itself out of its own
power.”25 It is misleading to read the motivation behind this claim about
the sui generis character of religion as merely defensive in intent without
taking into account the general problems in the philosophy of mind that
motivate it. For an idealist, in contrast to a materialist, the mind has the ca-
pacity to originate, spontaneously, ideas, concepts, and aims of its practical
action and striving. Ideas and practices in all cultural (geistig) domains infused
with ideal productions of the mind such as art, law, religion, ethics, and even
philosophy itself, could not be conceived as straightforward effects of in-
teractions between material things. Instead, these cultural arenas had to be
understood as products of the spontaneous capacity of mind to shape itself,
to originate, and be bound by, its own content. Here, already, Troeltsch re-
jects a crude form of naturalistic, causal, explanation of religion—and culture
as a whole—by referencing the autonomy of Geist from the domain of mech-23 Christian Albrecht, editorial introduction to “Selbstständigkeit der Religion,” in Ernst
Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 20 vols., ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, Christian Albrecht, Trutz
Rendtorff, and Gangolf Hübinger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1998–2015), vol. 1 (2009), 359.
24 Ernst Troeltsch, “Die Selbstständigkeit der Religion,” in Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesam-
tausgabe, vol. 1 (2009), 365.
25 Ibid., 1:364.
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A Science of Religionanical causation and arguing that even the representation of Natur is, in part,
the product of the mind’s spontaneous, productive “power.”
In essays following soon after, Troeltsch explicitly applied his idealist frame-
work to critics of religion that were defending an alliance between Darwin
andmaterialism in his milieu, such as Herbert Spencer. In particular, Troeltsch
wrote two trenchant essays in which his preoccupation with questions that
were at the heart of Baden neo-Kantianism is on full display. The first was an
attack on the concessions to materialism in the work of Lotze’s student Julius
Baumann, published in 1897, entitled “Modern Semi-Materialism” (Moderner
Halbmaterialismus); the second, “Haeckel as a Philosopher” (Haeckel als
Philosoph), written in 1900, was a criticism of Ernst Haeckel, the controver-
sial popularizer of Darwin in Germany whose books championed the alliance
of Darwinism and materialism as the only properly scientific view of the cos-
mos. The central argument Troeltsch makes against both of these thinkers
reiterates his earlier claim about the autonomous character of religion and
brings the problem of psychologism into view. While Troeltsch’s critique of
Baumann is more nuanced, his complaint against Haeckel captures his gen-
eral criticism of both. Troeltsch writes that Haeckel “never learned to distin-
guish between psychology and epistemology.”26 Indeed, if he had, he would
not make the mistake of characterizing Denken (thought) as a product of the
“mechanical labor of the brain” rather than as “operating only through itself, as
determined only by its own norms, completely independent and self-sufficient
as the highest judge and proprietor of norms.”27 Troeltsch’s attacks were not
directed against Darwin per se, but against philosophers who leaned on Dar-
win’s conception of evolution by natural selection and of humanity’s evolu-
tionary origins to defend materialism and psychologistic theories of value.
Troeltsch’s claim about the spontaneous and autonomous nature of thought
echoed a central premise drawn from sources in classical German Idealism,
in particular Kant and Fichte, that also inspired Windelband and Rickert.28
Denken cannot be considered as a mere mental event analogous to an event
observed innaturewith antecedent efficient causes and subsequent effects.
Instead, the content of thought had to be considered in part as both the
cause and effect of the mind’s own intrinsic, productive power. The mind
posited and pursued ideas that orient and give content to both action and
thoughtandmove it towardafulfillmentandcompletionof its aims. In these
essays, Troeltsch distinguishes between the standpoint of epistemology over-
against psychology through the claim of the autonomy and self-sufficiency26 Ernst Troeltsch, “Haeckel als Philosoph,” in Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2
(2013), 789.
27 Ibid., 2:790.
28 Rickert in particular was an avid defender of Fichte and wrote trenchant essays in de-
fense of Fichte’s articulation of the idealist position and even of Fichte’s philosophy of reli-
gion that Troeltsch read. See Heinrich Rickert, Fichte’s Atheismusstreit und die Kantische Philosophie
(Berlin: Reuter & Reichard, 1899).
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Aof the normative and ideal contents of thought from investigation of the
material and causal conditions in which it occurs. The problem with Baumann
and Haeckel, Troeltsch complains, was that their own claims to valid, true,
rational, or even scientific thinking were normative claims, not descriptive
ones. Yet, it was impossibleforanynormativeprescriptiontobevindicatedon
the basis of the purely descriptive andmechanistic stance that these thinkers
advanced as the properly scientific worldview. It is an altogether different
question to ask how thought works and how it ought to work if it is to achieve
the aim of getting the world, and itself, right. Indeed, the fact that many of
the claims thesematerialist Darwinians weremaking were normative went un-
acknowledged. Not only did these thinkers fail to reflect on their own norma-
tive claims in any rigorous manner, the explanandum of what this normativity
consisted in and where it fit within the world of causal interactions between
material objects did not come into view. Troeltsch cites Windelband’s Präl-
udien inhis essayonHaeckel, andhehadclearly readRickert, as anearly review
of Rickert’sKulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft (The science of culture and
the science of nature) from 1899 attests, yet his claim about the autonomy of
mind does not indicate any turn away from the less reductive naturalisms of
Lotze and Dilthey; the distinctions between psychology and epistemology,
while giving early clues of his concerns over a transition from description to
evaluation, are not yet indicative of an alliance with Windelband and Rickert’s
specific version of neo-Kantianism.29
Although seeds of overlap with Rickert’s theory of validity are present in
these earlier essays, Troeltsch did not deeply engage with Rickert’s thought
until his 1904 essay, “Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie” (Modern philosophy
of history). While touching upon broader trends in the philosophy of his-
tory, this essay is in essence a lengthy and detailed critical review of Rickert’s
monumental and still-classic book on theMethodenstreit first published in two
parts in 1896 and 1902, respectively, and edited significantly through five later
editions,The Limits of Concept Formation in the Natural Sciences (Die Grenzen der
Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung). In this essay, Troeltsch writes that
he “can only express enthusiastic agreement with the basic thoughts of Rick-
ert’s work.”30 The basic thoughts Troeltsch has in mind, he goes on to discuss
in turn, are Rickert’s emphasis of the difference between psychology and epis-
temology, his distinction between the amorphous and chaotic flux of histor-
ical events and the scientific project of grasping history in concepts, and his
emphasis on the distinction between the a posteriori task of accumulating his-
torical knowledge and the a priori task of reflecting on the presuppositions of
reasoning. Nonetheless, this essay also makes it clear that as Troeltsch moved
from these more general points of agreement to specific characterizations of29 Ernst Troeltsch, “Review of Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft,” in
Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1 (2009), 527–33.
30 Ernst Troeltsch, “Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie,” in Baron, Gesammelte Schriften, 2:719.
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research and investigation into valid values, his stark differences from Rickert
began to show.
As Troeltsch struggled with the significance of Rickert’s work, he increas-
ingly came to see the crucial weakness of Rickert’s transcendental theory of
value to lie in its account of the relationship between the real, the given em-
pirical material of cultural and natural history, and the ideal, the norma-
tively valid principles that both thought and agency logically presupposed.
In essence, this was the problemof finding the relationship between concrete
values of cultural life in its historical development and the normative values
that they must be shown to contain if their claims to validity were to be ra-
tionally redeemed. Troeltsch’s essay frames this as a problem in the philoso-
phy of history, and his objections to Rickert already in this initial confron-
tation begin to show decisive points of difference that throw into question
the wholeheartedness of his “shift.” Indeed, this essay shows important steps
that led Troeltsch to later pose the problem of “historicism” and its over-
coming “through history” in a way that Rickert would never have been able
to accept.31
“What connection,” Troeltsch asks, “is there between the mere concept of
valid values generally, the main result of epistemology, and factual histori-
cal value-formations, the results of historical research?”32 In a crucial pas-
sage, Troeltsch complains that
an ultimate aim as the a priori of the epistemological subject signifies only a nec-
essary relation to something universally valid [allgemein-gültiges]. . . . But then noth-
ing is yet said about which actions and which concrete and specific goals lead to this
aim. Epistemology can only deduce what is necessary as a formal aim, it can only de-
velop forms of thought and of the setting of ends. Every content of thought and agency
stems from experience and from the psychological subject in the streaming diversity
of the real. Thus the content of these forms is always directed to experience, and the
concept of absolute norms is always directed to history.33
Even in this early essay, Troeltsch shows his reluctance to abandon the im-
portance of psychological investigation and a posteriori empirical research
in the face of Rickert’s strict transcendental method. Troeltsch’s objection
here to the purely abstract and formal character of Rickert’s conception of
valid values—despite his clear simultaneous endorsement of Rickert—led
him to turn to psychology and history in a way that Rickert all along resisted
as succumbing to psychologistic errors. The room that Troeltsch was making
here forhistoryandpsychologycouldonlyappearanonstarteragainstRickert’s31 Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und Seine Probleme, in Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe,
vol. 16 (2012), 1098.
32 Troeltsch, “Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie,” 704.
33 Ibid., 708.
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Anotion that valid norms could be won if they could be defended as neces-
sary presuppositions of thought and agency—at all places and times—or else
not at all. Troeltsch’s objection to the overly formal character of Rickert’s
notion of valid values and his concessions to history and psychology here is
an early hint that his profession of a turn to Rickert’s neo-Kantianism is not
to be taken at face value.
There are further hints in this essay of Troeltsch’s reluctance toward key
aspects of Rickert’s thought. A central question that Rickert left unanswered,
for Troeltsch, lay in how the transcendental theory of valid values could orient
and inform concrete practical life and decisionmaking. This was the problem
of discovering how the epistemological subject, committed implicitly to nec-
essarily valid values, was related to the psychological subject living a concrete
life and adopting concrete values in a particular culture at a particular time.
The real limitation of Rickert’s theory of value became obvious, for Troeltsch,
when the directly normative and constructive questions of individual orien-
tation and Lebensführung were posed to Rickert’s formal notion of validity.
This concern to give a philosophical theory of validity some concrete impli-
cations for practical life led Troeltsch to claim in direct conflict to Rickert
that “the synthesis of the epistemological and the psychological subjects re-
sults always from an act of individual commitment [Überzeugungstat], and it
is just this individual character that is part of its ethical value.”34 The bridge
between concrete life and the abstract deliverances of philosophy could only
be accomplished through acts of individual decision. These acts of individ-
ual commitment and “synthesis” gave the rationally necessary, but merely for-
mal, idea of valid values like the abstract value of truth concrete life and actu-
ality in the context of particular cultural formations.
Troeltsch’s objection to Rickert in this essay can be characterized as a re-
newed version of the formalism objection that Hegel and others leveled
against Kant’s practical philosophy and its supreme moral principle. The mere
idea of necessarily valid values, or indeed also of a Kantian categorical im-
perative, alone is empty unless it can be shown to have been actualized, and
to be capable of being acted upon, in the rich configurations of value and
the concrete ideals of collective life in history. Of course, Rickert never in-
tended his transcendental epistemology to yield such concrete content and
he strictly distinguished, for this reason, between the transcendental task of
philosophy, the task of positive science, and the task of nonintellectual life more
generally. Philosophy could not yield concrete norms for how the sciences
investigate nature, nor for how individuals ought to pursue self-cultivation in
their ethical lives, but merely to redeem the sense in which these formal aims
were genuinely valid despite the deliverances of the natural and historical sci-
ences that appear to indicate the contrary. Troeltsch’s dissatisfaction with this
abstract and purely theoretical character of philosophy led him to abandon34 Ibid., 712.
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tal method.
This early essay shows that it was Troeltsch’s aim to give the theory of nor-
mativity concrete content, such that it could conceivably shape cultural prac-
tices and guide individual living, that would to give the empirical study of cul-
ture and history normative significance for life. Troeltsch even offered an
alternative conception of how science and philosophy could inform and even
fashion concrete values in a way that transgressed the purely theoretical role
that Rickert relegated them to. Troeltsch argued that “the effort to base one’s
judgment upon the broadest basis, to maintain continuity with everything
that has been achieved, and to decide on the basis of sober comparisons:
These determine the scientific character of such a judgment, but the scien-
tific character does not eliminate the individuality of such a decision.”35 The
“scientific” character of such a project consisted in its procedure and its in-
tent, but Troeltsch admitted that this could not override the fact that any
such judgments maintained an irremovable residue of individuality, decision,
and therefore extrascientific interest. This mixture of scientific and extra-
scientific aims would override Rickert’s distinction between the task of sci-
ence to pursue truth for its own sake and the values embedded in nonscien-
tific spheres. It also challenged Rickert’s notion that normatively valid values
had to be derivable from universal features of agency; Troeltsch’s individu-
alist residue could only undermine their claim to genuine validity.
Finally, Troeltsch’s initial engagement with Rickert showed that although
he was deeply persuaded by the necessity of the epistemological standpoint
next to psychology, it did not go far enough. At the end of Troeltsch’s crit-
ical essay, he gestures in the direction of a resolution to the problem of psy-
chologism that goes further beyond Rickert’s transcendental epistemology
than the points previously mentioned. He writes that “despite all cautious for-
mulation, the combination of the psychological and the epistemological sub-
ject is in truth a metaphysical problem.”36 While Rickert hoped to provide a
theory of normativity based on the presuppositions of rational agency alone,
Troeltsch complained that this was inadequate. Troeltsch does little in this
essay to fill out the idea of metaphysics that he has in mind or to give a de-
tailed argument for the necessity of this turn to metaphysics, but it is clear
that he comes to think that no resolution of the relationship between the
transcendental and the empirical, the epistemological and the psychologi-
cal, the ought and the is, would be possible without venturing forth into the
troubled waters of metaphysics.37 This was of course a clear and conscious35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 728.
37 A similar argument against Rickert has recently been advanced by Benjamin Crowe in “Faith
and Value: Heinrich Rickert’s Theory of Religion,” Journal of the History of Ideas 71, no. 4 (2010):
617–36. Like Troeltsch, and others of Rickert’s generation, Crowe argues that Rickert’s theory of
normativity is insufficient without a metaphysical foundation of some sort.
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Astep beyond the confines of Rickert’s theory of normativity, a step beyond
Kant.
In the years immediately following Troeltsch’s essay on Rickert’sGrenzen, he
worked on the collection of essays on the philosophy and science of religion
that allegedly carried through his turn to Rickert’s theory of validity, and an
analysis of these can allow us to come to some more bold conclusions con-
cerning the extent of Troeltsch’s turn to Rickertian philosophy. In keeping
with his attention to the theme of psychology and epistemology, Troeltsch
declared in his lecture delivered to a US audience at the St. Louis Louisiana
Purchase exposition in 1904 during a session entitled “Contemporary Prob-
lems in the Philosophy of Religion” that “psychology and epistemology will
always be the fixed core of the science of religion, both conceived in the re-
lation that Kant fundamentally assigned them.”38 This lecture was an appre-
ciative but critical response to William James’s famous 1901–2 Gifford Lec-
tures later published as The Varieties of Religious Experience, and one of the first
and most influential responses to James’s psychology in German academic
theology.39 The main message of this lecture was very clear: James’s assem-
blage and arrangement of psychological data were massive scientific achieve-
ments, but they were incomplete without analysis in light of Kant’s insistence
on the crucial role of epistemology and normative inquiry next to the de-
scriptive sciences. Troeltsch insisted that his Kantian critique of what he saw
as James’s characteristically American contribution to the philosophy of reli-
gion was not an artifact of nationalist sentiment or allegiance. Instead, it came
fromthe realization thathe later claimed turnedhim in favorofRickert’s the-
ory of transcendental validity, namely, that if science “demands above all em-
pirical knowledge of the phenomenon [of religion], it does so of course only
to be able to answer the question of truth-content on the basis of this knowl-
edge . . . and the question of truth-content is always a question of the valid
[das Geltende].”40
The theory of normativity entered into discussion precisely when it came
to evaluating claims to truth and knowledge, and such claims were made not
only by scientists but of course by religious practitioners themselves. Although
Troeltsch found James’s work to be an incredible achievement, he complained
that psychology “analyzes, generates types and categories, shows relatively con-
stant connections and interactions. But just here lie the limits of such a psy-
chology, which can be endlessly expanded in its descriptions, but can never
advise us on the validity and truth-content through its own resources. For
the science of religion this cannot be the last word.”41 Or, again, “The valid38 Ernst Troeltsch, “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft,” in Ernst
Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 6 (2014), 236.
39 Trutz Rendtorff, editor’s introduction to “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der
Religionswissenschaft,” in Ernst Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 6 (2014), 207.
40 Ibid., 6:227.
41 Ibid.
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A Science of Religioncannot be determined through the accumulation of factual phenomena or
through the arbitrary determination and establishment of something factual,
but only through recourse to universally valid concepts, inherent in thought
or reason.”42 Troeltsch went on to position these points on the problem of
the normativity of knowledge within a broad history of Western thought; he
considered himself, and Rickert, to be reviving the central spirit of rational-
ism from Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Descartes over against the empiricism
of Hume, Locke, andWilliam James. However, the problem that immediately
presented itself once the distinction between psychology and epistemology, em-
piricism and rationalism, was properly recognized was how to understand the
relation between these two distinct forms of inquiry. Once again, as Troeltsch
ventured beyondmere recognition of the difference between description and
evaluation andmore deeply into the philosophical details of how these relate,
his decisive differences with Rickert emerged.
Troeltsch’s essay on Rickert’s Grenzen indicated his departure from Rick-
ert through the formalism objection and the necessity of metaphysics, and
his essay on the science of religion augmented these points with the further
criticisms. He labeled Rickert’s Kantian position an experience-immanent
(erfahrungsimmanent) rationalism, which aimed to arrive at universally valid
values by reflecting on the conditions of the possibility of experience, rather
than deriving them from pure thoughts or through observation of natural
objects given to the senses. Troeltsch affirmed this approach and its method
to sift through and dig beneath the manifestations of thought and agency to
discover the rational principles that were latent in them. However, Troeltsch
added that “epistemological norms are different from merely psychological
facts, but can only be retrieved from them . . . psychology is the entranceway
to epistemology.”43 If we take the example of the value of truth that was cen-
tral to Rickert, we might interpret Troeltsch’s claim here to be that there is
a difference between the psychological act of valuing truth and the epistemo-
logical effort to redeem this value as genuinely valid. This much is in keeping
withRickert’s basic conception of philosophy. But Troeltsch goes on to say that
redeeming this value is a matter of “retrieving” it from psychological investi-
gation. It is unclear whether or not Troeltsch’s aim here was to rationally re-
construct Rickert’s views, but this statement is a clear departure fromRickert’s
transcendental method, which sought to justify the validity of different val-
ues—such as the value of truth—not by first studying what is valued by var-
ious agents but by reflecting on necessary presuppositions of thought and
action.
Of course, Troeltsch’s lecture was on the contribution of William James’s
Varieties, and for an American audience he was keen to acknowledge this con-
tribution to philosophy of religion. But in acknowledging here that psycho-42 Ibid., 6:228.
43 Ibid., 6:240.
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Alogical description has any implication for normative analysis, or in his essay
on Rickert that historical research has any role for determining valid values,
Troeltsch conceded ground to empiricism that Rickert strictly denied. Indeed,
Rickert’s book-length, scathing critique of life philosophy (Lebensphilosophie)
written in 1920 entitled Die Philosophie des Lebens: Darstellung und Kritik der
Philosophischen Modeströmungen unsrer Zeit (The philosophy of life: presenta-
tion and critique of the fashionable philosophical trends of our time), explic-
itly rejected Troeltsch’s point about the necessity of psychology in considering
the problem of valid values.44 Rickert saw Lebensphilosophie to be represented
most starkly by Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, Friedrich Nietzsche, and
various naturalists and Darwinists of all stripes, but he also counted William
James among the Lebensphilosophen in this book. He argued that James com-
mitted the same fallacy as all other subjectivist, psychologistic, and naturalist
theorists of normativity in that he reduced rationally undeniable values that
were constitutive of scientific inquiry itself into facts about natural drives
and psychological states and so failed to appreciate the necessity of a transcen-
dental standpoint on the problem of normative validity.
In addition to reiterating the importance of empirical research for in-
quiry into validity, Troeltsch’s lecture also fills in the metaphysics that he
gestured toward in his earlier review of Rickert. He argues that it is pre-
cisely mysticism that holds the key to both the universal and rational element
of religions as well as the synthesis of the epistemological and psychological
subjects. In mystical experience, an a priori element of consciousness is ac-
tualized in a way that unifies the sphere of rational validity and the psycho-
logical stream of consciousness. Troeltsch even goes so far as to say that mys-
tical experience manifests the “great unsolvable basic mystery of life, that is
always active but never grasped,” that it is the “hidden unity of cosmic reason”
or the “effect of the divine, creative original power, which is the embodiment
of what is and what ought to be.”45 He gestures here again to Rudolf Eucken’s
conception of a “noologie,” a cosmic ground and underlying unity to both
reason and nature that Rickert’s strict separation between “real” being and
“nonreal” values could not conceive.46 For Troeltsch, there was an underlying
metaphysical unity between the individual and the supra-individual, behind
reason, nature, history, and life. Here too, Troeltsch sees normatively valid val-
ues as being produced and actualized by psychological subjects in history,
and this production was itself to be understood as a manifestation of an un-
derlying metaphysical unity, the divine life, that encompassed both reason
and nature.44 Troeltsch cites Rickert’s book on Lebensphilosophie in the footnotes of the sections on Ba-
den neo-Kantianism in Troeltsch’s Historismus but does not explicitly discuss it.
45 Troeltsch, “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie,” 251–52.
46 Thanks to Brent Sockness for indicating the importance of Rudolf Eucken and Leibniz’s
monadology for understanding Troeltsch’s metaphysics and the issues that divided Troeltsch
and Rickert.
74
This content downloaded from 141.241.026.012 on January 15, 2020 02:11:16 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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his stance toward Rickert that remains consistent throughout the essays from
this period, including his essay on “Philosophy of Religion” and his short book
on Kant. Troeltsch clearly took from Baden neo-Kantianism an emphasis on
the division between description and normative analysis, between the inves-
tigation of facts and causes and the task of seeking reasons and justifications.
However, this basic point is not sufficient to constitute a full endorsement of
Rickert, nor would it unambiguously place Troeltsch within any of the turn-
of-the-century neo-Kantian or late-Idealist factions. While this point is im-
portant for the cases being made by various neo-Kantians concerning psy-
chologism, Troeltsch’s acceptance of this difference is not enough to justify
his claim to have adopted Rickert’s strict antipsychologistic position. The
crucial claim of Rickert’s philosophy was not merely distinguishing philoso-
phy from science and arguing for the necessity of normative analysis along-
side science, but also arguing that the empirical sciences were not relevant
for inquiry into the validity of values. The import that Troeltsch gave to psy-
chology and history in his work from this period and for the task of norma-
tive analysis was a clear departure from the more strict division between quid
facti and quid juris that marked Rickert’s thought. The second conclusion is
naturally that Troeltsch’s turn to metaphysics as a solution to Rickert’s dual-
ism between the is and the ought also departed from a defining feature of the
Baden neo-Kantianism. Even though Rickert’s late writings hint at a metaphys-
ical unity of being and value, he consistently considered speculations about
this unity to be beyond the bounds of what could claim the universality and
normative necessity of reason, of science, and of the sphere of knowledge.
Troeltsch was not alone in making these criticisms of Rickert. Indeed,
Rickert’s student Emil Lask, who has been found to be influential for Hei-
degger’s own dismissal of neo-Kantian value theory, made a similar complaint
against Rickert that his dualism of Sein and Sollen required an ontological res-
olution.47 Much dissatisfaction with Baden neo-Kantianism has resulted from
its strict dualism between being and value, psychology and epistemology.
Troeltsch’s rejection of the finality of this dualism came in part from his in-
sistence on the need for philosophy and science to contribute to validating
concrete, and not merely formal, cultural values. Troeltsch considered the
scientific procedure for arriving at an individual “synthesis” of cultural values
as a metaphysically loaded act, one that performed and reenacted the unifi-
cation of the normative space of reasons and the natural space of causes that
characterized the underlying cosmic unity ofGeist and Natur itself. Through
the act of individual commitment, each individual personality became amicro-
cosm of the whole of nature and history and its underlying unity. In the essays47 See Theodore Kisiel, “Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask,” Man
and World 28 (1995): 197–240.
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Amentioned here, Troeltsch refers to a recurring group of figures and ideas he
has in mind who equally rejected Rickert’s strict dualism, including Henri
Bergson’s vitalist elan vital, Rudolf Eucken’s concept of a “noologie” that pro-
vided a metaphysical source of both mind and nature in a cosmic nous, and
even Lotze’s teleological Naturphilosophie.48 In very early and late writings, in-
cluding his retrospective “My Books,” Troeltsch refers to Leibniz’s “organicist”
monadology as providing the final, rationalist metaphysical resolution of the
unity of human rationality and nature and of psychology and epistemology.49
Troeltsch’s continuing alignment with these thinkers signifies, in the end, that
his turn to Rickert was only ever half-hearted.I I I . TROELTSCH, R ICKERT, AND THE VERY POSS IB IL ITY
OF A SCIENCE OF RELIGION
This reconstruction of Troeltsch’s development in relation to Rickert has
shown how his early concern over whether a religious stance could be jus-
tified in the face of a reductive naturalism coming from the sciences left him
embroiled in the debates over psychologism that defined his generation.
Troeltsch’s declaration of his transition from Lotze and Dilthey to Windel-
band and Rickert, perhaps unwittingly, revealed a moment at which he be-
came entangled between competing, and by many lights, incompatible phil-
osophical schools on the psychologismproblem. Lotze andDilthey represented
a diffuse set of thinkers that Rickert in 1921 came to designate as vitalist
Lebensphilosophen, who held that normative values both originated in and could
be justified only in relation to life, understood as historically dynamic, pre-
reflective natural impulses, desires, and drives. Rickert represented the com-
plete opposite, a philosopher who rejected completely any naturalist or meta-
physical foundation of normativity and who saw values as aims presupposed
by both thought and structural features of rational agency.
In a sense, Troeltsch’s Auseinandersetzung with Rickert and Windelband
can be captured simply as a quarrel over whether or not a nonpsychologistic
theory of normativity could stop with the transcendental argument that valid
norms are always presupposed by reason, or rather had to rest further on an
underlying, metaphysical conception of the unity ofGeist andNatur. Troeltsch’s
move to metaphysics was of course a decisive break with both of the neo-
Kantian schools. Here we might think that we end up back at Kant versus
Schleiermacher, Hegel, or Schelling and the question of critical versus pre-
critical metaphysics. Yet these different assessments of the possibility of meta-
physics resonated throughout each thinker’s conception of how valid values48 Troeltsch, “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie,” 252.
49 Troeltsch, “Meine Bücher,” 10.
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A Science of Religionwere to bediscovered anddefended.On the onehand,Troeltsch continued to
hold that concrete valid values in all cultural spheres had to be achieved
through a complex, and even individual, wrestling with empirical material of
cultural history that had to maintain a fundamentally irrationalist residue.
Rickert, on the other hand, maintained the staunch rationalist view that if
the values found in cultural activity were to make a claim to objective validity,
their formal goals had to be capable of being derived through a purely a priori
and rational procedure.
Despite the conclusions reached here that Troeltsch’s philosophical com-
mitments transgressed the principles of Baden neo-Kantianism that he aligned
himself with, I hope also to have shown that Troeltsch’s unique positions must
be understood as a critical response to Rickert and to basic problems that they
shared in common. Indeed, Troeltsch’s resort to theistic metaphysics can only
be understood in relation to an antipsychologistic division between the is and
theought, between psychology and epistemology, that he shared with Rickert
and that was the defining problem of this generation of German philoso-
phers. Troeltsch’s philosophy of religion, or philosophical theology, was finally
an attempt to overcome the dualism between normativity and nature, natu-
ral drives and valid values, that plagued turn of the century attempts to defend
the role of philosophy next to the natural sciences.
I would like to close by placing this debate in a broader context. Troeltsch’s
dialogue with Rickert is a local example of the problems of mind, normativ-
ity, rationality, and the nature of science itself that attended the conception of
a Religionswissenschaft at its origins. Debates over these problems were spread
across the university and had implications for the foundations of many emerg-
ing and still young disciplines, including psychology, economics, sociology,
and anthropology. Rickert and Troeltsch both defended the core claim that
science necessarily, indeed as a matter of achieving its core aims and de-
fending its own presuppositions, raised questions that we today would re-
gard as metaethical and, controversially, even metaphysical. Indeed, reli-
gion presented unique problems as an object of scientific study precisely
because religions themselves advanced ethical, metaethical, and metaphys-
ical claims taken to be normative that could be studied only by paying atten-
tion to their reasons in addition to their causes. Rickert and Troeltsch are
instructive for contemporary debate not only for their particular views and
their identification of fundamental problems but because they show that de-
termining what science, philosophy, and religion are and what boundaries
exist between them is itself a theoretical task that raises fundamental problems
of mind, knowledge, nature, and value that cannot be avoided. In other words,
reflection on the science of religion calls for philosophy understood as the at-
tempt to arrive at normative, valid, even correct positions on these issues. More
speculatively, these thinkers suggest to us, against the grain of much contem-
porary theorizing, that when fields of inquiry are themselves understood as77
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Agoal-directed tasks that are committed to normative principles and thus
are required also to investigate the ground of these normative principles—
as both Rickert and Troeltsch understood them to be—the scientific aim, the
aim of philosophy, and the aim of religious thought do not need to be con-
sidered in conflict.78
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